The glide-path mechanism in Employee Capital Plans by Jakubowski, Sebastian
240 
THE GLIDE-PATH MECHANISM  





The regulatory landscape of pension funds in Poland continues to become ever more 
complex. One of the most significant changes in the Polish pension market is the 
introduction of Employee Capital Plans (ECP). This new form of occupational 
pension plan is featured by auto-enrolment and investment policy based on the glide-
path mechanism (Kolek et al. 2020). 
Auto-enrolment, which is designed to cover people having no access to any 
occupational pension programme, is bringing millions of workers into a private 
pension plan based on capital funding, many for the first time (Szczepański 2017; 
Kolek and Sobolewski 2019).  
This puts a special burden on the ECP system – to invest capital of individual ECP 
participants in the most responsible way. Adoption of the glide-path mechanism 
in the investment policy of the ECP funds is one of the ways of fulfilling this duty. 
The glide-path represents the fund’s changing mix of investments. Over the years, 
the ECP fund adjusts allocations to the equity portion and the debt portion. When 
ECP participants are young, the asset mix is more growth oriented. This means 
the dominance of the equity portion. When ECP participants get older and their 
retirement date nears, the ECP fund’s investment portfolio “glides down” to 
a more conservative mix of investments. This means the dominance of the debt 
portion. This fairly new concept has not been fully analysed in the literature. There 
are a limited number of publications mentioning this new way of conducting 
investment policy (Ge 2019; Sołdek and Stachnio 2018; Melicherčík et al. 2015; 
Krawiec 2014, 2015). But the glide-path mechanism in ECP funds has never been 
analysed. Moreover, there are a very limited number of publications on ECP 
system, both in local literature (Jedynak 2019; Fijałkowska et al. 2019; Wrzesiński 
2019; Kolek and Sobolewski 2019; Wojewódka 2019; Jakubowski and Prusik 
2019) and in the international literature (Ociepa-Kicińska and Dawidowicz 2018; 
Naczyk 2019; Pobłocka and Dybał 2019;). It is because the ECP system is quite 
new. It began operation on July 1st, 2019 and it is still at the stage of introduction. 
The system will be fully implemented in 2022. Thus, there is need to describe and 
analyse the new concept of the glide-path mechanism and the way it has been 





The purpose of this research is to analyse the regulatory landscape for the glide-path 
mechanism implemented in the ECP system. To achieve this research objective  
the method of critical legal dogmatics and the economic analysis of law method  
were employed. 
 
2. Debt portion and equity portion of an ECP fund’s portfolio 
The investment policy of an ECP fund is determined by all levels of regulations. 
The most important and the most universal regulation for the ECP fund’s 
investment policy is to be found in the act of 27 May, 2004 on investment funds 
and alternative investment fund management (the IF Act 2004). In principle, an 
ECP fund follows the investment limits for open-end investment funds (art. 42 
para. 1 of the ECP Act). The specific provisions that bind only the ECP funds are 
set in the act of 4 October, 2018 on Employee Capital Plans (the ECP Act 2018) 
One of the most important regulations, specific only for ECP funds, is a division 
of their portfolio into an equity portion and a debt portion (art. 2 para. 1 point 1 
and 2 of the ECP Act). 
 
2.1. The debt portion of the investment portfolio 
The debt portion of the ECP fund’s portfolio may be invested in: 
– money market instruments, 
– bonds, treasury bills, mortgage bonds, deposit certificates, 
– other transferable securities incorporating debts, 
– bank deposits, 
– vanilla derivatives, 
– selected non-standardised derivatives (providing underlying asset is an 
aforementioned debt instrument), 
– units of investment funds (providing half of their portfolio is invested in 
aforementioned debt instruments) (art. 2 para. 1 point 1 of the ECP Act). 
Pursuant to art. 37 para. 11 of the ECP Act the debt portion of ECP fund’s 
investment portfolio is divided into two parts. At least 70% of the debt portion 
must be invested in securities issued or guaranteed by the Polish Treasury, the 
National Bank of Poland or a local government unit. This part of the debt portion 
may be also invested in securities issued or guaranteed by central governments or 
central banks of EU states, the European Central Bank, the European Union or the 
European Investment Bank. Also, securities issued or guaranteed by selected 
international organisations (the European Economic Community, the International 
Monetary Fund or the Bank for International Settlements) (Marcinkowska 2009, 
p. 234) might be included in the debt portion of ECP fund’s investment portfolio, 
providing these instruments have an investment-rating provided by one of the 
biggest rating agencies (S&P, Fitch, Moody’s or DBRS). In order to maintain 
liquidity, an ECP fund is also allowed to hold cash deposits in banks or credit 
institutions. The cash deposits are also included in the 70% part of the debt portion. 
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The remaining 30% of the debt portion can be invested in other debt instruments 
(art. 37 para. 11 point 2 of the ECP Act). This means that no more than one-third 
of debt portion might be invested in money market instruments, corporate bonds, 
mortgage bonds, deposit certificates, other transferable debt securities, other debt 
derivatives or other units of investment funds, providing these instruments have 
an investment-rating from one of the biggest rating agencies. Debt instruments 
without an investment-rating can constitute no more than 10% of the debt portion 
of the ECP fund’s investment portfolio. 
There is very small group of scholars raising doubts as to whether the ECP capital 
should be used to fund the public debt (Oręziak 2016, 2019; Hrynkiewicz and 
Szukalski 2018; Kalina-Prasznic 2019). They argue that ECP funds shouldn’t be 
allowed to invest in Polish Treasury Bills in the same way as Open-end Pension 
Funds are forbidden to. The majority of scholars point out that the Polish debt 
market is too shallow to exclude Treasury Bills from the investment portfolios of 
ECP funds (Dybał 2017; Jedynak 2018; Jakubowski 2019; Szczepański 2013, 
2015, 2019; Kolek and Sobolewski 2019; Wojewódka 2019; Jakubowski and 
Prusik 2019; Chybalski 2018; Chybalski and Marcinkiewicz 2018). 
2.2. The equity portion of the investment portfolio 






– other transferable securities incorporating property rights,
– vanilla derivatives,
– selected non-standardised derivatives (providing the underlying asset is the
aforementioned equity instrument),
– units of investment funds (providing half of their portfolio is invested in
aforementioned equity instruments) (art. 2 para. 1 point 2 of the ECP act).
Pursuant to art. 37 para. 13 of the ECP Act the equity portion of ECP fund’s 
investment portfolio is divided into several parts. At least 40% of the equity 
portion must be invested in blue-chip stocks. To be more precise, shares, pre-
emptive rights, allotment certificates and other equity instruments issued by the 
biggest companies quoted on Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) and which are 
quoted on the Warszawski Indeks Giełdowy 20 (WIG20). Art. 37 para. 13 point 
1 of the ECP Act also includes derivatives on these instruments and derivatives 
on the WIG20 index. 
Pursuant to 37 para. 13 point 4 of the ECP Act, at least 20% of equity portion must 
be invested in foreign equity instruments (shares, pre-emptive rights, allotment 
certificates, derivatives, etc.) quoted on stock exchanges located in OECD countries.  
Both the 40% and 20% limits are minimum limits. It means that up to 80% of the 




companies quoted on the WSE or derivatives of these instruments. On the other 
hand, up to 60% of the equity portion may be invested in equity instruments 
quoted on stock exchanges located in the OECD countries. Together, just these 
two classes of assets may constitute 100% of the equity portion. 
But ECP fund is also allowed to invest in medium-sized and small-sized 
companies quoted on the WSE. Pursuant to art. 37 para. 13 point 2 of the ECP 
Act, an ECP fund is allowed to invest in shares, pre-emptive rights, allotment 
certificates and other equity instruments issued by the medium-sized companies 
quoted on the WSE and included in the Warsaw Stock Exchange Index of 40 
medium-sized companies (mWIG40). This limit also includes derivatives of these 
instruments and mWIG40 index. The limit for these equity instruments is no more 
than 20% of the equity portion. As opposed to the limits to the WIG20 equity 
instruments and foreign investments, this is the maximum limit. The ECP fund is 
not allowed to buy more shares of medium-sized companies. 
The ECP fund is also allowed to buy shares of small-sized companies quoted, or 
soon-to-be quoted, on the WSE . Pursuant to 37 para. 13 point 3 of the ECP Act, 
the ECP fund is allowed to invest no more than 10% of the equity portion in shares, 
pre-emptive rights, allotment certificates and other equity instruments issued by 
small-sized companies in Poland. Just like the limit on medium-sized companies, 
this is also the maximum limit. The ECP fund is not allowed to buy more shares 
of small-sized companies. 
Regulations shaping the equity-portion are much more controversial than the 
regulations shaping the debt-portion. First, the ECP fund investments on the local 
bourse are strongly directed towards the blue-chips included in the WIG20 index. 
This index is dominated by state-controlled enterprises as defined by Bałtowski 
and Kozarzewski (2016). Only 8 joint-stock companies included in the WIG20 
are not under control of the state. These are LPP S.A., Santander Bank Polska 
S.A., NG2 S.A. (former CCC Obuwie S.A.), CD Projekt S.A., Cyfrowy Polsat 
S.A., mBank S.A., Orange Polska S.A., Play Communications S.A. The remaining 
12 companies are state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. According to the 
official information from December 31st 2019 – the State Treasury holds 29.43% 
of PKO BP S.A. shares, 27.52% of Polski Koncern Naftowy ORLEN S.A. shares, 
34.19% of PZU S.A. shares, 32.8% of Pekao S.A. shares , 31.79% of KGHM 
Polska Miedź S.A. shares, 71.88 % of PGNiG S.A. shares, 31.94% of Alior S.A. 
shares , 55.16% of Jastrzębska Spółka Węglowa S.A. shares, 53.19% of LOTOS 
S.A. shares, 40.45% of TAURON S.A. , 51.52% of ENERGA S.A. shares. 
Together these companies comprise more than 70% of the average weight of the 
WIG20 index. Thus, forcing an ECP fund to invest 40% and more of the equity 
portion into WIG20 companies should be considered as directing ECP capital into 
state-controlled enterprises. In this way, the ECP system is used to increase the 
state’s impact on the Polish economy and to expand economic nationalism  
in Poland (Flores-Macias and Musacchio 2009; Kozarzewski et al. 2019).  
The declared objective of this is to enhance, in the long run, the Polish State’s 
economic capacity, international importance and even reindustrialisation (The 
Strategy for Responsible Development 2017). Thus, the role of local equity 
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investments of ECP capital is significant, especially in recapitalizing of the so-
called “national champions” – the biggest and the most valuable state-controlled 
enterprises. In this respect, the state itself is the indirect beneficiary of ECP capital 
accumulation and local equity investments of ECP funds. 
The regulations concerning foreign equity investments also raise some doubts. 
According to statutory provisions, foreign investments into equity instruments are 
not limited by the size of a company at all. In consequence, the ECP fund has  
no barriers for financial support of foreign small-sized companies. This is a stark 
difference to the harsh limits on investments in Polish small-sized companies. 
This loop-hole in regulations on foreign equity investments allows the mechanism 
of the purposeful placing of initial public offerings (IPOs) on the most liberal 
stock exchanges located in the OECD countries and transferring ECP capital  
to small-sized companies owned by selected people (e.g. friends and acolytes  
of the governing party). This creates the conditions for the proliferation  
of cronyism (Hellman et al. 2003; Jasiecki 2013; Kozarzewski and Bałtowski 
2019). Economic entities from the outside of the public sector may benefit from 
facilitated access to ECP capital at the expense of local companies and local 
financial institutions. This means a higher investment risk for ECP participants 
and lower chances of development for local financial markets. 
The threats of economic nationalism and cronyism are additionally magnified by 
the domination of state-controlled financial institutions (ECP providers) on the 
ECP market. On December 31st, 2019, after half a year of functioning of the ECP 
market, the total value of assets accumulated in ECP funds reached 84.7 mm zł. 
48.3% of these assets were gathered by state-controlled financial institutions 
(Kolek 2020). PKO TFI gathered 28.7 mm zł, PZU TFI gathered 9 mm zł, Pekao 
TFI gathered 3.1 mm zł, Pocztylion-Arka PTE gathered 60,000  zł, PFR TFI 
gathered 1,500 zł. The dominance of the state controlled ECP providers is another 
major threat for the proper functioning of the ECP market.  
Non-state controlled ECP providers that failed to gather a sufficient number 
of ECP participants are likely to quit the market. ECP providers driven exclusively 
by profits are discouraged by the high administrative costs of functioning on the 
ECP market (Wojewódka 2020). High economic barriers to enter this market will 
push away potential new entrants and petrify low competition between ECP 
providers. A similar process took place in the Open-end Pension Funds market in the 
noughties and teens of 21st century (Banaszczak-Soroka and Jakubowski 2011). 
In the near future we will probably see that domination of state controlled ECP 
providers creates a feedback mechanism. In this scenario, state-controlled ECP 
providers may direct a growing amount of ECP capital into state-controlled 
companies and even into private entities that have connections inside the 
governing party. 
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3. The Glide-path mechanism
The ECP fund has a target-date that roughly (+- 5 years) coincides with the year 
of the participant’s anticipated end of their professional career and their 
retirement. In order to provide target-date funds to all generations of ECP 
participants, ECP providers must manage at least 8 target-date funds. Right now, 
these are: target-date 2025 fund, target-date 2030 fund, target-date 2035 fund, 
target-date 2040 fund, target-date 2045 fund, target-date 2050 fund, target-date 
2055 fund and target-date 2060 fund. Some of the ECP providers also created  
a target-date 2020 fund and a target-date 2065 fund. The target-date in the ECP 
fund is the approximate date an investor reaches 60 years of age and acquires the 
right to benefits from an Employee Capital Plan. 
The ECP fund investment policy is based on the glide-path mechanism. The glide-
path represents the fund’s changing mix of investments. Over the years, the ECP 
fund’s managing company (ECP provider) adjust allocations to the equity portion 
and the debt portion. When participants are young and further from retirement, 
the asset mix is more growth-oriented (domination of the equity portion). As the 
participant’s target retirement date nears, the ECP fund “glides down” to a more 
conservative mix of investments and reduces the amount of equity over time in its 
portfolio (dominance of the debt portion). This is due to the changes in the risk 
tolerance of ECP participants.  
The three key decisions in building the glide-path are: the percentage for the 
equity portion of the portfolio, the final equity portion landing point, and the rate 
at which the equity portion declines in a portfolio. The glide-path also needs  
to take into consideration the participants’ need for future growth and their 
tolerance for volatility during their retirement. 
Table 1. Equity portion, debt portion and room for the discretionary investment 
policy – % of ECP fund’s assets 
Age of ECP 
participant 
Equity portion Debt portion 
Room for the 
discretionary 
investment policy 
18 to 40 years old from 60% to 80% from 20% to 40% 20% 
41 to 50 years old from 40% to 70% from 30% to 60% 30% 
51 to 55 years old from 25% to 50% from 50% to 75% 25% 
56 to 60 years old from 10% to 30% from 70% to 30% 20% 
60 and more years 
old 
from 0% to 15% from 85% to 100% 15% 
Source: art. 40 para. 1 of the ECP Act. 
Pursuant to art. 40 para. 1 of the ECP Act, for the first 22 years, ECP funds’ glide-
path provides between 60% and 80% equity exposure (equity portion of the 
portfolio). The rest is typically invested in debt instruments (debt portion of the 
portfolio). This changes when the target-date is 20 years away. The next stage 
lasts only 10 years and equity exposure is from 40% to 70%. This changes when 




and 50%. For the last 5 years before the target date, the equity exposure is from 
10% to 30%. At the target date, the equity exposure is lowered to between 0% and 
15% and remains stable for the rest of the ECP fund existence. 
This shape of the glide-path leaves some room for a discretionary investment 
policy. During the first 22 years, 20% of the ECP portfolio can be invested either 
in equity or debt instruments. From 10 to 20 years to the target-date, the latitude 
for discretionary investment policy is the widest at 30% of the ECP portfolio.  
In the following decades, it systematically declines. Between 5 and 10 years to the 
target-date, the freedom for a discretionary investment policy is still wide at 25% 
of the ECP portfolio. In the last 5 years before the target date, the room for  
a discretionary investment policy is lowered to 20% and at the target date, it falls 
to just 15% of the ECP portfolio. 
Thanks to the wide freedom for a discretionary investment policy, ECP funds can 
function either as to-target-date funds or through-target-date funds. To-target-date 
funds maintain a static asset allocation once a participant reaches the target date 
(he or she is 60 years old). This approach is useful for the ECP participants that 
want to cash out the accumulated capital as soon as they reach the age of 60.  
Through-date-funds continue to gradually ease back on equity exposure through 
the first ten- or twenty-years post target-date. This approach is useful for the ECP 
participants that want to slowly decumulate ECP capital. This aims to address the 
needs of ECP participants who are exposed to longevity risk. The assumption 
behind target-date funds with a “through” glide path is that ECP participants 
should adopt a consistent long-term strategy that adjusts asset allocation well into 
retirement (International Labour Organisation 2019). Increasing life expectancy 
forces many ECP participants to maintain earnings potential from significant 
equity exposure – in order to avoid the prospect that an ECP participant might 
outlive his or her savings (Bielawska 2019). 
The rationale for equity exposure even after reaching the target date is the high 
long-term earnings potential. On average, equities have historically generated 
stronger investment returns than debt instruments over the long term, albeit with 
higher volatility (Bielawska 2017). While it’s not unusual for equities  
to underperform compared to debt instruments or other assets for relatively short 
periods, equities have a historical record of outperforming them over time. This is 
especially important for those ECP participants who reached their target date (60 
years of age) and are being paid out their money for the next 10 years in monthly 
instalments (Jakubowski 2020). 
It’s worth noting that the glide path statutory regulations are so well designed that 
the majority of ECP providers just duplicate these stipulations. Only Nationale-
Nederlanden ECP refined these regulations and introduced a smooth glide path 
that changes on a quarterly basis (Nationale-Nederlanden 2019). The further 
analysis of Key Investor Information Documents (KIID) issued by ECP funds 
leads to the conclusion that ECP providers don’t use the full potential of the ECP 
investment policy. All ECP providers miss the opportunity to emphasise socially 
responsible investments and green investments. It is inadvisable to create narrow 
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and detailed statutory regulations that promote these types of investments.  
The statutory regulations should be general enough to leave some room for  
a discretionary investment policy. It is the ECP providers who should grasp the 
opportunity and use the lowers rank regulations (statues of individual ECP funds) 
to direct ECP capital into green and socially responsible investments. In more 
developed and mature pension markets, these types of investments are 
a meaningful incentive for the accumulation of pension capital and an important 
factor during the selection of a pension plan (Dopierała et al. 2020). 
3. Conclusion
The Glide-path mechanism makes an ECP fund a single and easy-to-use 
investment vehicle for participants who lack financial literacy and need 
professional management of their retirement assets. But the target-date fund 
approach in the ECP system also creates possibilities for financially experienced 
ECP participants. They have a chance to manage their ECP capital in a more 
personalised way. Art. 45 of the ECP Act provides ECP participants with the right 
to conversion of target-date funds’ units. This means that ECP participants can 
transfer their ECP capital from one target-date fund to another – providing these 
funds are managed by the same ECP provider and the minimum transfer is not 
less than 10% of ECP participant’s capital. In consequence, ECP participants can 
change and even spread their ECP capital among 10 different ECP funds.  
The right to transfer ECP capital to another target-date fund would be one of the 
biggest advantages of participation in the ECP system, providing it was also 
accompanied by the right to change the ECP provider. Denying this right  
to financially experienced ECP participants, who accumulate capital in state 
controlled ECPs, is a major disincentive. In consequence ECP participation 
among financially experienced workers is low (Instytut Emerytalny 2019).  
In conclusion, it should be stated that in the era of incoming technological 
singularity (Kurzweil 2005), it is impossible to outline the pattern of growth for 
the global economy in the next 50 years. This means a universal formula for the 
glide-path mechanism for ECP funds does not exist. Thus, it’s of great importance 
that statutory provisions leave room for discretionary investment policy. 
The regulations of the ECP Act do that quite well. 
At the same time the glide-path mechanism implemented in the ECP funds 
strongly protects the interests of financially illiterate participants of the ECP. 
Increasing the share of the debt portion in ECP fund’s portfolio lowers the 
investment risk and protects the accumulated capital of ECP participants.  
For financially experienced ECP participants the glide-path mechanism is not 
problematic. They are aware of their rights and they know how to transfer their 
ECP capital to other ECP funds. It is the regulation of investment limits that  
is flawed and needs to be liberalised. 
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